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Abstract
Prisoner’s Dilemma mainly treat the choice to cooperate or defect as an atomic
action. We propose to study online learning algorithm behavior in the Iterated
Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) game, where we explored the full spectrum of reinforce-
ment learning agents: multi-armed bandits, contextual bandits and reinforcement
learning. We have evaluate them based on a tournament of iterated prisoner’s
dilemma where multiple agents can compete in a sequential fashion. This allows us
to analyze the dynamics of policies learned by multiple self-interested independent
reward-driven agents, and also allows us study the capacity of these algorithms
to fit the human behaviors. Results suggest that considering the current situation
to make decision is the worst in this kind of social dilemma game. Multiples
discoveries on online learning behaviors and clinical validations are stated. 1
1 Introduction
Social dilemmas expose tensions between cooperation and defection. Understanding the best way of
playing the iterated prisoner’s dilemma (IPD) has been of interest to the scientific community since
the formulation of the game seventy years ago [1]. To evaluate the algorithm a round robin computer
tournament was proposed, where algorithms competed against each others [2]. The winner was
decided on the average score a strategy achieved. Using this framework, we propose here to focus on
studying reward driven online learning algorithm with different type of attentions mechanism, where
we define attention "as the behavioral and cognitive process of selectively concentrating on a discrete
stimulus while ignoring other perceivable stimuli" [3]. Following this definition, we analyze three
algorithms classes: the no-attention-to-the-context online learning agent (the multi armed bandit
algorithms) outputs an action but does not use any information about the state of the environment
(context); the contextual bandit algorithm extends the model by making the decision conditional on
the current state of the environment, and finally reinforcement learning as an extension of contextual
bandits which makes decision conditional on the current state of the environment and the next state
of the unknown environments.
This paper mainly focuses on an answer to the following questions:
• Does attending to the context for an online learning algorithm help on the task of maximizing
the rewards in an IPD tournament, and how do different attention biases shape behavior?
• Does attending to the context for an online learning algorithm help to mimic human
behavior?
To answer these questions, we have performed two experimenters: (1) The first one where we have
run a tournament of the iterated prisoner’s dilemma: Since the seminal tournament in 1980 [1], a
number of IPD tournaments have been undertaken [2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11]. In this work, we adopt
1The data and codes can be accessed at https://github.com/doerlbh/dilemmaRL
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a similar tournament setting, but also extended it to cases with more than two players. Empirically,
we evaluated the algorithms in four settings of the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma: pairwise-agent
tournament, three-agent tournament, “mental”-agent tournament. (2) Behavioral cloning prediction
task: where we train the the three types of algorithm to mimic the human behavior on some training
set and then test them in a test set.
Our main results are the following:
• We have observed that contextual bandits are not performing well in the tournament, which
means that considering the current situation to make decision is the worst in this kind of
social dilemma game. Basically we should either do not care about the current situation or
caring about more situations, but not just the current one.
• We have observed that bandit algorithms (without context) is the best in term of fitting the
human data, which implies that humans may not consider the context when they play the
iterated prisoner’s dilemma.
2 Related Work
There is much computational work focused on non understanding the strategy space and finding
winning strategies in the iterated prisoner’s dilemma; Authors in [12] present and discuss several
improvements to the Q-Learning algorithm, allowing for an easy numerical measure of the exploitabil-
ity of a given strategy. [13] propose a mechanism for achieving cooperation and communication
in Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning settings by intrinsically rewarding agents for obeying the
commands of other agents. We are interested in investigating how algorithms are behaving and also
how they are modeling the human decisions in the IPD, with the larger goal of understanding human
decision-making. For-instance, In [14] authors have proposed an active modeling technique to predict
the behavior of IPD players. The proposed method can model the opponent player’s behavior while
taking advantage of interactive game environments. The data showed that the observer was able
to build, through direct actions, a more accurate model of an opponent’s behavior than when the
data were collected through random actions. [15] they propose the first predictive model of human
cooperation able to organize a number of different experimental findings that are not explained by
the standard model and they show also that the model makes satisfactorily accurate quantitative
predictions of population average behavior in one-shot social dilemmas. To the best of our knowledge
no study has been exploring the full spectrum of reinforcement learning agents: multi-armed bandits,
contextual bandits and reinforcement learning in social dilemma.
3 Experiments Setup
Here, we describe the two main experiments we have run, the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD), and
the Behavioral Cloning with Demonstration Rewards (BCDR).
3.1 Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD)
Table 1: IPD Payoff
C D
C R,R S,T
D T,S P,P
The Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) can be defined as a matrix game
G = [N, {Ai}i∈N , {Ri}i∈N ], where N is the set of agents, Ai is the
set of actions available to agent i with A being the joint action space
A1 × · · · ×An, and Ri is the reward function for agent i. A special case
of this generic multi-agent IPD is the classical two-agent case (Table 1).
In this game, each agent has two actions: cooperate (C) and defect (D),
and can receive one of the four possible rewards: R (Reward), P (Penalty),
S (Sucker), and T (Temptation). In the multi-agent setting, if all agents
Cooperates (C), they all receive Reward (R); if all agents defects (D), they all receive Penalty (P);
if some agents Cooperate (C) and some Defect (D), cooperators receive Sucker (S) and defector
receive Temptation (T). The four payoffs satisfy the following inequalities: T > R > P > S and
2R > T + S. The PD is a one round game, but is commonly studied in a manner where the prior
outcomes matter to understand the evolution of cooperative behaviour from complex dynamics [16].
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3.2 Behavioral Cloning with Demonstration Rewards (BCDR)
Here we define a new type of multi-agent online learning setting, the Behavior Cloning with Demon-
stration Rewards (BCDR), present a novel training procedure and agent for solving this problem. In
this setting, and similar to [17, 18, 19] the agent first goes through a constraint learning phase where
it is allowed to query the actions and receive feedback rek(t) ∈ [0, 1] about whether or not the chosen
decision matches the teacher’s action (from demonstration). During the deployment (testing) phase,
the goal of the agent is to maximize both rk(t) ∈ [0, 1], the reward of the action k at time t, and the
(unobserved) rek(t) ∈ [0, 1], which models whether or not the taking action k matches which action
the teacher would have taken. During the deployment phase, the agent receives no feedback on the
value of rek(t), where we would like to observe how the behavior captures the teacher’s policy profile.
In our specific problem, the human data plays the role of the teacher, and the behavioral cloning aims
to train our agents to mimic the human behaviors.
3.3 Online Learning Agents
We briefly outlined the different types of online learning algorithms we have used:
Multi-Armed Bandit (MAB): The multi-armed bandit algorithm models a sequential decision-
making process, where at each time point a the algorithm selects an action from a given finite set
of possible actions, attempting to maximize the cumulative reward over time [20, 21, 22]. In the
multi-armed bandit agent pool, we have Thompson Sampling (TS) [23], Upper Confidence Bound
(UCB) [21], epsilon Greedy (eGreedy) [24], EXP3 [25] and Human Based Thompson Sampling
(HBTS) [26].
Contextual Bandit (CB). Following [27], this problem is defined as follows. At each time point
(iteration), an agent is presented with a context (feature vector) before choosing an arm. In the
contextual bandit agent pool, we have Contextual Thompson Sampling (CTS) [28], LinUCB [29],
EXP4 [30] and Split Contextual Thompson Sampling (SCTS) [31].
Reinforcement Learning (RL). Reinforcement learning defines a class of algorithms for solving
problems modeled as Markov decision processes (MDP) [32]. An MDP is defined by the tuple with a
set of possible states, a set of actions and a transition function. In the reinforcement learning agent
pool, we have Q-Learning (QL), Double Q-Learning (DQL) [33], State–action–reward–state–action
(SARSA) [34] and Split Q-Learning (SQL) [35, 36]. We also selected three most popular handcrafted
policy for Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma: “Coop” stands for always cooperating, “Dfct” stands for
always defecting and “Tit4Tat” stands for following what the opponent chose for the last time (which
was the winner approach in the 1980 IPD tournament [1]).
Table 2: Parameter settings for different reward
biases in the neuropsychiatry-inspired split models
λ+ w+ λ− w−
“Addiction” (ADD) 1± 0.1 1± 0.1 0.5± 0.1 1± 0.1
“ADHD” 0.2± 0.1 1± 0.1 0.2± 0.1 1± 0.1
“Alzheimer’s” (AD) 0.1± 0.1 1± 0.1 0.1± 0.1 1± 0.1
“Chronic pain” (CP) 0.5± 0.1 0.5± 0.1 1± 0.1 1± 0.1
“Dementia” (bvFTD) 0.5± 0.1 100± 10 0.5± 0.1 1± 0.1
“Parkinson’s” (PD) 0.5± 0.1 1± 0.1 0.5± 0.1 100± 10
“moderate” (M) 0.5± 0.1 1± 0.1 0.5± 0.1 1± 0.1
Standard split models 1 1 1 1
Positive split models 1 1 0 0
Negative split models 0 0 1 1
Agents with Mental Disorder Properties. To
simulate behavior trajectories, we used three set
of “split” algorithms which were designed to
model human reward bias in different neurologi-
cal and psychiatric conditions. We now outlined
the split models evaluated in our three settings:
the multi-armed bandit case with the Human-
Based Thompson Sampling (HBTS) [26], the
contextual bandit case with the Split Contex-
tual Thompson Sampling (SCTS) [31], and the
reinforcement learning case with the Split Q-
Learning [35, 36]. All three split models are standardized for their parametric notions (see Table
2 for a complete parametrization and [31] for more literature review of these clinically-inspired
reward-processing biases). For each agent, we set the four parameters: λ+ and λ− as the weights of
the previously accumulated positive and negative rewards, respectively, w+ and w− as the weights
on the positive and negative rewards at the current iteration.
4 Results on Algorithms’ Tournament
Game settings. The payoffs are set as the classical IPD game: R = 5, T = 3, P = 1, S = 0.
Following [37], we created create standardized payoff measures from the R, S, T, P values using
two differences between payoffs associated with important game outcomes, both normalized by the
difference between the temptation to defect and being a sucker when cooperating as the other defects.
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Figure 1: Success, Teamwork, Cooperation and Competition in two-agent tournament.
Figure 2: Cumulative reward and cooperation rate averaged by class in two- and three-player setting.
State representations. In most IPD literature, the state is defined the pair of previous actions of self
and opponent. Studies suggested that only one single previous state is needed to define any prisoner’s
dilemma strategy [38]. However, as we are interested in understanding the role of three levels of
information (no information, with context but without state, and with both context and state), we
expand the state representation to account for the past n pairs of actions as the history (or memory)
for the agents. For contextual bandits algorithms, this history is their context. For reinforcement
learning algorithms, this history is their state representation. In the following sections, we will present
the results in which the memory is set to be the past 5 action pairs (denoted Mem = 5, and more
results of Mem = 1 in Appendix A.)
Learning settings. In all experiments, the discount factor γ was set to be 0.95. The exploration is
included with -greedy algorithm with  set to be 0.05 (except for the algorithms that already have
an exploration mechanism). The learning rate was polynomial αt(s, a) = 1/nt(s, a)0.8, which was
shown in previous work to be better in theory and in practice [39]. All experiments were performed
and averaged for at least 100 runs, and over 50 or 60 steps of dueling actions from the initial state.
Reported measures. To capture the behavior of the algorithms, we report five measures: individual
normalized rewards, collective normalized rewards, difference of normalized rewards, the cooperation
rate and normalized reward feedback at each round. We are interested in the individual rewards since
that is what online learning agents should effectively maximize their expected cumulative discounted
reward for. We are interested in the collective rewards because it might offer important insights on
the teamwork of the participating agents. We are interested in the difference between each individual
player’s reward and the average reward of all participating players because it might capture the
internal competition within a team. We record the cooperation rate as the percentage of cooperating in
all rounds since it is not only a probe for the emergence of strategies, but also the standard measure in
behavioral modeling to compare human data and models [40]. Lastly, we provided reward feedback
at each round as a diagnostic tool to understand the specific strategy emerged from each game. (The
color codes throughout this paper are set constant for each of the 14 agents, such that all handcrafted
agents have green-ish colors, multi-armed bandits agents red-ish, contextual bandits agents blue-ish
and reinforcement learning agents purple-ish).
4.1 Multi-Agent Tournament
Results for the two-agent tournament. In the two-agent tournament, we recorded the behaviors of
the 14 agents playing against each other (and with themselves). Figure 1 summarized the reward and
behavior patterns of the tournament. We first noticed that the multi-armed bandits and reinforcement
4
Figure 3: Reward feedbacks and cooperation rates in some two-player and the three-player settings.
Bandits
Contextual
bandits
Reinforcement
learning
Figure 4: Mental variants in three agent pools: reward, cooperation, teamwork, competition (Mem=5).
learning algorithms learned to cooperate when their opponent is Coop, yielding a high mutual rewards,
while the contextual bandits algorithms mostly decided to defect on Coop to exploit its trust. From
the cooperation heatmap, we also observed that reinforcement learning algorithms appeared to be
more defective when facing a multi-armed bandits or contextual bandits algorithm than facing another
reinforcement learning algorithm. The multi-armed bandits algorithms are more defective when
facing a contextual bandits algorithm than facing a reinforcement learning algorithm or another
multi-armed bandits algorithm. Adversarial algorithms EXP3 and EXP4 failed to learn any distinctive
policy in the IPD environment. We also discovered interesting teamwork and competition behaviors in
the heatmaps of collective rewards and relative rewards. In general, the contextual bandits algorithms
are the best team players, yielding an overall highest collective rewards, followed by reinforcement
learning algorithms. The reinforcement learning algorithms are the most competitive opponents,
yielding an overall highest relative rewards, followed by multi-armed bandits algorithms.
Figure 2 summarized the averaged reward and cooperation for each of the three classes, where we
observed handcrafted algorithms the best, followed by the reinforcement learning algorithms and
then the multi-armed bandits algorithms. The contextual bandits algorithms received the lowest final
rewards among the four classes of agents. Surprisingly, the cooperation rate figure suggested that a
lower cooperation rate didn’t imply a higher reward. The most cooperative learning algorithm class
is the contextual bandits, followed by the reinforcement learning algorithms. The most defective
algorithms, the multi-armed bandits, didn’t yield the highest score.
More detailed probing into the specific games (Figure 3) demonstrated more diverse strategies than
these revealed by the cooperation rates. For instance, in the game of QL vs. CTS, we observe that
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CTS converged to a fixed cooperation rate within the first few rounds and stayed constant since then,
while the QL gradually decayed its cooperation rate. In the game of UCB1 vs. DQL, UCB1 seemed
to oscillate between a high and low cooperation rate within the first few rounds (because it was built
to explore all actions first), while the DQL gradually decayed its cooperation rate. In the game of
DQL vs. Tit4Tat, we observed a seemingly mimicking effect of the DQL to a tit-for-tat-like behaviors.
In the game of SARSA vs. LinUCB, LinUCB converged to a fixed cooperation rate with the first
few rounds and stayed constant since then, while the SARSA gradually decayed its cooperation rate.
There seemed to be a universality of the three classes of the agents within the first few rounds.
Cognitive interpretations of these learning systems. The main distinctions between the three
classes of algorithms are the complexity of the learning mechanism and the cognitive system they
adopt. In the multi-armed bandits setting, there is no attention to any contexts, and the agents aim to
most efficiently allocate a fixed limited set of cognitive resources between competing (alternative)
choices in a way that maximizes their expected gain. In the contextual bandits setting, the agents
apply an attention mechanism to the current context, and aim to collect enough information about
how the context vectors and rewards relate to each other, so that they can predict the next best action
to play by looking at the feature vectors. In the reinforcement learning setting, the agents not only
pay attention to the current context, but also apply the attention mechanism to multiple contexts
related to different states, and aim to use the past experience to find out which actions lead to higher
cumulative rewards. Our results suggested that in the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma of two learning
systems, an optimal learning policy should hold memory for different state representations and
allocate attention to different contexts across the states, which explained the overall best performance
by the reinforcement learning algorithms. This further suggested that in zero-sum games like the
Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma, participating learning systems tend to undergo multiple states. The
overall underperformance of the contextual bandits suggested that the attention to only the current
context was not sufficient without the state representation, because the learning system might mix the
the context-dependent reward mappings of multiple states, which can oversimplify the policy and
potentially mislead the learning as an interfering effect. On the other hand, the multi-armed bandits
ignored the context information entirely, so they are not susceptible to the interfering effect from the
representations of different contexts. Their learned policies, however, didn’t exhibit any interesting
flexibility to account for any major change in the state (for instance, the opponent might just finish a
major learning episode and decide on a different strategy).
Results for the three-agent tournament. In the three-agent tournament, we wish to understand
how all three classes of algorithms interact in the same arena. For each game, we picked one
algorithm from each class (one from multi-armed bandits, one from contextual bandits and one
from reinforcement learning) to make our player pool. We observed in Figure 2 a very similar
pattern as the two-player case: reinforcement learning agents demonstrated the best performance
(highest final rewards) followed by multi-armed bandits, and contextual bandits performed the worst.
However, in three-agent setting, although the contextual bandits is still the most cooperative, and
reinforcement learning became the most defective. More detailed probing into the specific games
(Figure 3) demonstrated more diverse strategies than these revealed by the cooperation rates. Take
the game eGreedy vs. LinUCB vs. DQL and the game UCB1 vs. LinUCB vs. QL as an example, the
multi-armed bandits algorithms started off as the most defective but later started to cooperate more in
following rounds, while the reinforcement learning algorithms became more and more defective. The
contextual bandits algorithms in both cases stayed cooperative at a relatively high rate.
4.2 “Mental” profiles in three classes of algorithms
In this experiment, we wish to understand which online learning algorithms does the best job
simulating different variants of mental profiles. We adopted the same parameter settings to set the
unified models of human behavioral agents in [31], which consist of multi-armed bandits, contextual
bandits and reinforcement learning agents to simulate neuropsychiatric conditions such as Alzheimer’s
disorder (AD), addiction (ADD), attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), Parkinson’s disease
(PD), chronic pain (CP) and dementia (bvFTD). To better understand these three unified models, we
performed the tournament within each of the three agent pools.
As shown in Figure 5, the trajectories of these mental variants demonstrated different levels of
diversity in the three classes of algorithms. The split multi-armed bandits models appeared to all
follow a decaying cooperation rates, but with different dacay rate. The split contextual bandits models
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demonstrated a more diverse range of cooperation rates while maintaining a constant rate in many
reward bias. The split reinforcement learning models introduced two types of behaviors: within the
first few rounds, the agents can either gradually decay its cooperation rates, or first becoming more
cooperative for a few rounds before decaying.
Figure 5: Trajectories of cooperation rate by the
mental variants in three agent pools.
Figure 4 offered a more comprehensive spec-
trum of these behaviors. The first thing we no-
ticed is that the three classes of models doesn’t
capture the same profile of the mental variants.
For instance, “addiction” (ADD) appeared to be
the most cooperative in the split multi-armed
bandits framework, but was also relatively de-
fective in the split reinforcement learning frame-
work. “Parkinson’s diesease” (PD) appeared to
be having the lowest collective rewards (a bad
team player) in the split multi-armed bandits
framework, but it contributed to the collective rewards very positively in the split contextual bandits
and split reinforcement learning frameworks. This suggests that there are more subtlety involved
in these multi-agent interactions such that the “unified” split models are not well capturing the
universality within each mental condition. Comparing the three agent classes in all four patterns
(individual rewards, cooperation rates, collective rewards and relative rewards), we do observe a more
diverse pattern in the reinforcement learning pool than the other two classes of algorithms.
Our simulation does matched the behavioral observations in several clinical studies. [41] studied
the cooperative behaviors in subjects playing Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma after receiving different
doseage of alprazolam, and discovered that in addiction-related test blocks, cooperative choices were
significantly decreased as a function of dose, consistent with our reinforcement learning group results
and previous reports showing that high acute doses of GABA-modulating drugs are associated with
violence and other antisocial behavior [42, 43]. [44] studied children playing Iterated Prisoner’s
Dilemma in a neuroimaging setting and reported that comparing with children with ADHD, the control
participants exhibited greater brain error monitoring signals for non-social options (i.e., betrayal) that
did not imply more losses for them and instead, generated more gains, while the ADHD children
exhibited no differential modulation between these options. The absence of neural modulation during
the IPD task in the ADHD children suggested of a general reward deficit in value-related brain
mechanisms, matching our observation that in the split contextual bandits and reinforcement learning
groups that “ADHD” exhibited an overall high cooperation rate and a comparatively low relative
rewards. Among all the mental variants, “behavioral variants of fronto-temporal dementia” (bvFTD)
appeared to be the most defective in all three split frameworks and obtain the lowest collective reward,
matching its clinical symptoms including inappropriate behavior, lack of empathy for others, lack of
insight, and impaired decision-making in affective scenarios [45, 46]
5 Results on Behavioral Cloning with Human Data
We collated the human data comprising 168,386 individual decisions from many human subjects
experiments [2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10] that used real financial incentives and transparently conveyed the
rules of the game to the subjects. As a a standard procedure in experimental economics, subjects
anonymously interact with each other and their decisions to cooperate or defect at each time period
of each interaction are recorded. They receive payoffs proportional to the outcomes in the same or
similar payoff as the one we used in Table 1. Following the similar preprocessing steps as [40], we
were able to construct the comprehensive collection of game structures and individual decisions from
the description of the experiments in the published papers and the publicly available data sets. This
comprehensive dataset consists of behavioral trajectories of different time horizons, ranging from 2
to 30 rounds, but most of these experimental data only host full historical information of at most past
9 actions. We further selected only those trajectories with these full historical information, which
comprised 8,257 behavioral trajectories. We randomly selected 8,000 of them as the training set and
the other 257 trajectories as the test set.
In the training phase, all agents are trained with the demonstration rewards as feedback sequentially
for the trajectories in the training set. In the testing phase, we paused all the learning, and tested
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Figure 6: Behavioral Cloning: bandits modeled human data the best with the lowest prediction error.
on the 257 trajectories independently, recorded their cooperation rate. In each test trajectory, we
compared their evolution of cooperation rate to that of the human data and compute a prediction error.
Figure 6 summarized the testing results of all the agents in predicting the actions and their cooperation
rates from human data. From the heatmap of the cooperation rates, we observe that the behavioral
policy that each agent cloned from the data varies by class. The reinforcement learning algorithms all
seemed to learn to defect at all costs (“tragedy of the commons”). The contextual bandits algorithms
mostly converged to a policy that adopted a fixed cooperation rate. Comparing with the other two,
the multi-armed bandits algorithms learned a more diverse cooperation rates across test cases. The
line plot on the right confirms our understanding. The cooperation rate by the real humans (the black
curve) tends to decline slowly from around 70% to around 40%. UCB1 and epsilon Greedy both
captured the decaying properties, mimicing the strategy of the human actions. The prediction error
analysis matches this intuition. The UCB1 and epsilon greedy algorithms (or the multi-armed bandits
algorithms in general), appeared to be best capturing the human cooperation behaviors.
As a side note, we would also like to point out the importance of the sanity check from the line plot
(the cooperation rate vs. round). In the prediction error figures, EXP3 and EXP4 seemed to have an
overall low error, but this can be misleading: from the cooperation rate figures, we noted that EXP3
and EXP4 didn’t seem to learn any policy at all (randomly choosing at 50% over the entire time),
while the other agents all appeared to have adopted a non-random strategies.
6 Conclusion
We have explored the full spectrum of online learning agents: multi-armed bandits, contextual
bandits and reinforcement learning. We have evaluated them based on a tournament of iterated
prisoner’s dilemma. This allows us to analyze the dynamics of policies learned by multiple self-
interested independent reward driven agents, where we have observed that the contextual bandit
is not performing well in the tournament, which means that considering the current situation to
make decision is the worst in this kind of game. Basically we should either do not care about the
current situation or caring about more situations, but not just the current one. We have also studied
the capacity of these algorithms to fit the human behavior. We observed that bandit algorithms
(without context) are the best in term of fitting the human data, which opens the hypothesis that
human are not considering the context when they are playing the IPD. Next steps include extending
our evaluations to other sequential social dilemma environments with more complicated and mixed
incentive structure, such as the fruit Gathering game and the Wolfpack hunting game [47, 48].
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7 Broader Impact
The broader motivation of this work is to increase the two-way traffic between artificial intelligence
and neuropsychiatry, in the hope that a deeper understanding of brain mechanisms revealed by
how they function (“neuro”) and dysfunction (“psychiatry”) can provide for better AI models, and
conversely AI can help to conceptualize the otherwise bewildering complexity of the brain.
Evidence has linked dopamine function to reinforcement learning via midbrain neurons and connec-
tions to the basal ganglia, limbic regions, and cortex. Neuron firing rates computationally represent
reward magnitude, expectancy, and violations (prediction error) and other value-based signals [49],
allowing an animal to update and maintain value expectations associated with particular states and
actions. When functioning properly, this helps an animal develop a policy to maximize outcomes
by approaching/choosing cues with higher expected value and avoiding cues associated with loss or
punishment. This is similar to reinforcement learning widely used in computing and robotics [32],
suggesting mechanistic overlap in humans and AI. Evidence of Q-learning and actor-critic models
have been observed in spiking activity in midbrain dopamine neurons in primates [50] and in the
human striatum using the blood-oxygen-level-dependent imaging (BOLD) signal [51].
The behavioral cloning results suggest that bandit algorithms (without context) are the best in term
of fitting the human data, which open the hypothesis that human are not considering the context
when they are playing the iterated prisoner’s dilemma. This discovery proposes new modeling
effort on human study in the bandit framework, and points to future experimental designs which
incorporate these new parametric settings and control conditions. In particular, we propose that our
approach may be relevant to study reward processing in different mental disorders, for which some
mechanistic insights are available. A body of recent literature has demonstrated that a spectrum of
neurological and psychiatric disease symptoms are related to biases in learning from positive and
negative feedback [52]. Studies in humans have shown that when reward signaling in the direct
pathway is over-expressed, this may enhance state value and incur pathological reward-seeking
behavior, like gambling or substance use. Conversely, enhanced aversive error signals result in
dampened reward experience thereby causing symptoms like apathy, social withdrawal, fatigue, and
depression. Both genetic predispositions and experiences during critical periods of development can
predispose an individual to learn from positive or negative outcomes, making them more or less at risk
for brain-based illnesses [53]. This highlight our need to understand how intelligent systems learn
from rewards and punishments, and how experience sampling may impact reinforcement learning
during influential training periods. Simulation results of the mental variants matches many of the
clinical implications presented here, but also points to other complications from the social setting that
deserve future investigation.
The literature on the reward processing abnormalities in particular neurological and psychiatric
disorders is quite extensive; below we summarize some of the recent developments in this fast-
growing field. It is well-known that the neuromodulator dopamine plays a key role in reinforcement
learning processes. Parkinson’s disease (PD) patients, who have depleted dopamine in the basal
ganglia, tend to have impaired performance on tasks that require learning from trial and error. For
example, [54] demonstrate that off-medication PD patients are better at learning to avoid choices
that lead to negative outcomes than they are at learning from positive outcomes, while dopamine
medication typically used to treat PD symptoms reverses this bias. Alzheimer’s disease (AD) is the
most common cause of dementia in the elderly and, besides memory impairment, it is associated with
a variable degree of executive function impairment and visuospatial impairment. As discussed in
[55], AD patients have decreased pursuit of rewarding behaviors, including loss of appetite; these
changes are often secondary to apathy, associated with diminished reward system activity. Moveover,
poor performance on certain tasks is associated with memory impairments. Frontotemporal dementia
(bvFTD) usually involves a progressive change in personality and behavior including disinhibition,
apathy, eating changes, repetitive or compulsive behaviors, and loss of empathy [55], and it is
hypothesized that those changes are associated with abnormalities in reward processing. For instance,
alterations in eating habits with a preference for carbohydrate sweet rich foods and overeating in
bvFTD patients can be associated with abnormally increased reward representation for food, or
impairment in the negative (punishment) signal associated with fullness. Authors in [56] suggest that
the strength of the association between a stimulus and the corresponding response is more susceptible
to degradation in Attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) patients, which suggests problems
with storing the stimulus-response associations. Among other functions, storing the associations
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requires working memory capacity, which is often impaired in ADHD patients. In [57], it is
demonstrated that patients suffering from addictive behavior have heightened stimulus-response
associations, resulting in enhanced reward-seeking behavior for the stimulus which generated such
association. In [58], it is suggested that chronic pain can elicit in a hypodopaminergic (low dopamine)
state that impairs motivated behavior, resulting into a reduced drive in chronic pain patients to pursue
the rewards. Reduced reward response might underlie a key system mediating the anhedonia and
depression, which are usually common in chronic pain. A variety of computational models was
proposed for studying the disorders of reward processing in specific disorders, including, among
others [54, 59, 60, 61, 57, 62].
The approach proposed in the present manuscript, we hope, will contribute to expand and deepen the
dialogue between AI and neuropsychiatry.
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A Supplementary Figures
Figure 7: Success and teamwork in two-agent tournament: individual rewards and collective rewards.
Figure 8: Cooperation and Competition in two-agent tournament: cooperation rate, relative rewards.
Figure 9: Cumulative rewards and cooperation rates averaged by class in two-player and three-player
setting (shown here the models trained with memory of 1 past action pairs).
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Figure 10: Mental variants in three frameworks: reward, cooperation, teamwork, competition (shown
here the models trained with memory of 1 past action pairs).
Figure 11: Trajectories of cooperation rate of the mental variants in three agent pools (Mem=1).
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Figure 12: Behavioral Cloning: bandit algorithms seem to better capture human data with lower
prediction error (shown here the models trained with memory of 1 past action pairs).
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